Sienna Jackson / Roundup
For the past several weeks, small groups of C.I.A. operatives have been working with the rebel forces in Libya – meeting with rebel leaders and helping to coordinate air strikes with coalition forces from the ground.
It’s all part of America’s ‘non-war war’ in Libya, balancing on a knife’s edge between violence and diplomacy, settling on a battle-by-proxy against Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi.
President Obama has signed off on providing arms to Libyan rebels, although the jury is still out in Washington on whether or not that weaponry should be shipped out.
Coalition forces have been waging an extended campaign against Qaddafi; the intelligence provided by C.I.A. and British M-I6 is being utilized in a bid to weaken the Qaddafi forces by targeting his most crucial military and strategic resources on the ground.
The president has promised not to send ground troops to the beleaguered nation, but that promise rings slightly hollow, in light of the current American strategy’s similarity to another C.I.A. – intensive initiative in nearby Afghanistan.
During the very denouement of the Cold War, the USSR had chosen to expand its influence by supporting the Marxist government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan against Islamic resistance fighters, the Mujahideen (of which Osama bin Laden, born of a wealthy Saudi Arabian family, was a key member.)
In response, the United States sent in C.I.A. operatives to work covertly with the rebel forces in Afghanistan.
The United States and Pakistan sided with the Mujahideen and bin Laden, providing funds, arms, and perhaps even training to the rebels, waging proxy war against the Soviet Union.
The resulting nine-year conflict destroyed the Soviet Union, and the bet made by the U.S. in siding with the rebels was successful.
But when the Soviets made their crippled withdrawal in the late 80s, the United States’ interest in the country withdrew as well, leaving Afghanistan a nation without a government.
People, both civilian and rebel (or in this case, normal civilians turned rebels) suffered in the wake without humanitarian aid from the U.S., overburdened by new conflicts that arose between the remaining factions of the resistance.
It is at this point that extremist faction like the Taliban and al Qaeda – led by an embittered bin Laden – took power.
That is the danger in cooperation with any resistance movement: you have to stick around for the clean up, or risk getting embroiled in the chaos that fills the void of power left by the defeated.
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